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Nation-building under the Austro-Hungarian Sceptre 
Croato-Serb Antagonism and Cooperation
In the nineteenth century many European nations became politically con-
scious of their “nationhood”, which became one of the factors in the crum-
bling of the two great empires in Central-East Europe – the Habsburg and 
the Ottoman Empire – at the beginning of the next century. Historians 
have termed this issue the Eastern Question, a question of filling up the 
vacuum created by the gradual erosion of Ottoman rule in Eastern Europe. 
The Eastern Question involved not only a repositioning of the Balkan states 
(especially Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania) but also of Russia and 
the Habsburg Empire, leading to Great Power rivalries and resulting in the 
First World War. 
The peoples of future Yugoslavia, most notably Croats and Serbs, ma-
tured as nations during this period. They strived for greater independence 
not only by resisting foreign rule but also by means of diplomacy and coop-
eration with nations who shared their aspirations either out of idealism or 
out of interest.  The Great Powers, however, chiefly decided their fate. The 
year 878 provides the most vivid example, when the borders of the South-
Slav peoples shifted drastically two times in four months as a consequence 
of diverging interests of the Great Powers. 
 See John Marriott, The Eastern Question (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 97); M. S. An-
derson, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923 (New York: Macmillan, 966).
 In March 878, Russia, having defeated the Ottomans, attempted to resolve the East-
ern Question to her advantage by the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 878). 
The agreement with the Ottomans provided Russia with overwhelming influence in the 
Balkans, including the much-desired outlet to the warm seas via a Greater Bulgaria, de 
facto a Russian protectorate that included the regions of Macedonia, Western Thrace, 
a portion of Albania, and a district of Serbia. Russia also awarded full recognition to 
Serbia, erstwhile an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire (reduced in 
the East by the Treaty of San Stefano to the advantage of Bulgaria) and Montenegro 
(almost tripled in size). In July 878, the Congress of Berlin, attended by Germany, 
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Development of Serb national movement until 1914
Modern Serbian history3 dates back to 804, when the First Serbian Insur-
rection against the Ottomans began, born out of the desire for national 
emancipation.4 This was the first national uprising against the Ottomans 
among the peoples of Southeast Europe, followed by the Greek Revolution 
of 8. Moreover, amongst the conquered Slavs of future Yugoslavia, only 
Serbs succeeded in creating an independent state in 878. Montenegro, 
which had never been completely subjugated by the Ottomans, was also 
recognized then.6 At the same time, these two states did not encompass all 
Austria-Hungary, Russia, Britain, France, Italy and Turkey, revised the Treaty of San 
Stefano, exploiting the fact that Russia, although victorious against the Ottomans, was 
exhausted by the war and at the verge of bankruptcy. Bulgaria, which to this day cel-
ebrates the day the Treaty of San Stefano was signed as its national day, was reduced, 
most of its extended territory having been restored to the Ottomans. The Congress of 
Berlin did recognize an independent Serbia and an independent Montenegro, within 
borders that suited the Great Powers, which were then impersonated by the Concert of 
Europe. It also granted Austria-Hungary the right to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
to control the allegedly independent Montenegrin port of Bar [Treaty between Great 
Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey, 3 July 878, 3 
CTS 7-9].
3 The history of Serb statehood is very rich, with the first Serbian dynasty established in 
the eighth century. It is not recounted here for the reason of brevity. For more informa-
tion, see Histoire du Peuple Serbe, ed. Dušan T. Bataković (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 
00). 
4 The First Serbian Uprising has also been called a “Serbian national revolution”. Bru-
tally crushed by the Ottomans in 83, it sparked the Second Serbian Uprising in 8, 
which led to Serbia’s semi-independence from the Ottomans in 87, formalized in 
89 by the Peace of Adrianople and hatti-sherifs in 89, 830 and 833. Pressured by 
Russia, the Sultan then granted Serbia the right to internal autonomy and its governor a 
hereditary title of a prince, but continued to oblige Serbia to pledge a fixed yearly tribute 
to the Porte. Prior to the uprisings, the rights of the vassal Serbia were regulated by vari-
ous decrees. See Wayne Vucinich, ed., The First Serbian Uprising 1804-1813 (Boulder, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 98); Leopold von Ranke, History of Servia and 
the Servian Revolution (London: Benn, 848). Please also note that “the Serbian elite 
raised the issue of national rights and territorial autonomy as early as 790, at the ec-
clesiastical-national diet held in Temesvar (present-day Romania) and attended by 7 
representatives of the aristocracy, high clergy and officer corps.” Dušan T. Bataković, “A 
Balkan-Style French Revolution? The 804 Serbian Uprising in European Perspective”, 
Balcanica XXXVI (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 006), 3-9.
 Treaty of Berlin, 3 July 878, 3 CTS 7-9 (Article XXXIV).
6 Ibid. (Article XXVI).
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the territories where Serbs lived. Until 9, more than a half of the Serb 
population lived under Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule.7
Despite the current revisionist claims by those favouring a non-
Serb Montenegrin identity, it is a historical fact that the aspirations of the 
Montenegrins in the late nineteenth century mirrored those of Serbs as a 
whole – unification and independence of Serb-inhabited lands. The great-
est Montenegrin poet Prince-bishop Petar Petrović Njegoš was a leading 
Serb national figure in the nineteenth century, instrumental in codifying 
the Kosovo myth as the central theme of the Serbian national movement.8 
The Petrović Njegoš dynasty, which ruled Montenegro, even made a brief 
attempt to assume the role of the Serb leader and unifier, but Montenegro’s 
small size and weak economy eventually led to the recognition of the pri-
macy of the Karadjordjević dynasty ruling out of Belgrade. Montenegrins 
had Serbian identity but they at once were proud of their state, especially 
in the area around Cetinje, the capital of the Kingdom of Montenegro. A 
sense of distinct statehood was strong enough to breed strong autonomist 
sentiments in a portion of Montenegro’s population following the 98 
unification with Serbia and the imminent disappearance of a Montenegrin 
state.9
In the nineteenth century, the Serbian national identity had fully de-
veloped. The Serbs were aware of their long history and tradition, great 
medieval civilization and cultural unity, regardless of the fact that they lived 
under different imperial administrations. Three elements, interwoven with 
the legacy of the medieval Serb Nemanjić dynasty, were imperative in the 
forging of Serb national identity and its preservation during long periods 
7 Slavenko Terzić, “The Right to Self-Determination and the Serbian Question” in 
The Serbian Question in the Balkans: Geographical and Historical Aspects, ed. Bratislav 
Atanacković (Belgrade: Faculty of Geography, University of Belgrade, 99), 40. See 
also Dimitrije Djordjević, Les revolutions nationals des peuples balkaniques (Belgrade: Ins-
titut d’Histoire, 96). 
8 See below.
9 See John D. Treadway, The Falcon and the Eagle, Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 
1908–1914 (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 983), 6-8, 0, 0. The 94 
edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica describes Montenegrins as belonging to the “Serb 
race”. Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Prince Kropotkin, C. Mijatovich and J. D. Bour-
chier, A Short History of Russia and the Balkan States; reproduced from the th edition 
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (London: The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 
94), , 6. According to Stevan K. Pawlovitch, A History of the Balkans 1804–1945 
(London and New York: Longman, 999), 08, Montenegrin “rulers considered them-
selves Serb, were generally supportive of a ‘Serb’ cause and willing to cooperate with 
Serbia, but nevertheless gave priority to their own territorial objectives”.
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of foreign domination – the Serbian Orthodox Church, the symbolism of 
Kosovo, and the Serbian language.
The identification of the Serbian Orthodox Church with the Serbian 
nation is deeply rooted in national consciousness. The medieval rulers of 
the Serbs were closely identified with the Serbian Church and its struggle 
for autonomy. Following the Byzantine tradition, members of the Serb 
Nemanjić dynasty founded monasteries, some became monks and achieved 
sainthood, and in 9 the pious St. Sava, son of Stefan Nemanja, became 
the first archbishop of an autocephalous Serbian church, freed from the 
jurisdiction of the Greek-led Archbishopric of Ohrid. The Church’s inde-
pendence was extinguished soon after 49, when the Ottomans conquered 
Serbia. The Serbian (Christian Orthodox) Church, under the name of the 
Patriarchate of Peć, re-emerged a century later (7), after an intervention 
by the influential Ottoman vizier of Serbian origin Sokollu Mehmed Pasha 
(Sokolović) who extended its jurisdiction, bringing almost the entire Ser-
bian nation under its wing.0 The church was essential to Serbian identity 
as the only surviving Serbian institution during the long period of foreign 
rule and thus a form of a surrogate Serb state. Christian Orthodoxy has 
been one of the main Serbian traits, though there has been an important 
Catholic Serb minority, mainly in Dalmatia. In addition, many Christian 
Serbs converted to Islam under the Ottomans, particularly in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
Oral folk traditions constituted another element nurturing Serbian 
national culture and a reassurance that the nation would rise against its 
oppressors. A national hero of epic songs, legendary Marko Kraljević, is 
“an embodiment of all that the Serbs wanted to believe of themselves – his 
heroism, his gentleness, his respect for the religious and social customs of 
his people, his ‘machismo’, even his cruelty, but above all his fierce opposi-
tion to the Turks and his intense national pride”. The real Marko Kraljević 
died fighting as an Ottoman vassal.   
 While Serb epic poetry also appealed to other Slav peoples of the 
Balkans, the Kosovo legends kept the spark of Serbian national conscious-
0 Naturally, Sokolović was Muslim, but three of the first four patriarchs of the re-estab-
lished Serbian Orthodox Church – Patriarchate of Peć, in Kosovo and Metohia, came 
from his family (the first patriarch was his brother, the Serb Orthodox monk Maka-
rije Sokolović). See Fred Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 98), 44; Djoko Slijepčević, Istorija srpske pravoslavne 
crkve [History of the Serbian Orthodox Church] (Belgrade: BIGZ, 99), vol. , 306, 
38-39.
 See below.
 Singleton, Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples, 4.
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ness alive for centuries, which burst into flame with Karadjordje’s3 revolt 
against the Ottoman Turks in 804. Legends of the Battle of Kosovo       
(�8 June 389) dominated Serbian literature and art before the twenti-          
eth century. Historians observe that neither Serbs nor Turks won the bat-
tle, while both the Serbian ruler and the Ottoman Sultan were killed in its 
course. However, the Ottoman conquest of Serbia followed,4 indicating 
that this battle represented a long-term loss for the Serbs. The Serbs have 
nonetheless celebrated the Battle of Kosovo as a symbol of their resistance 
to foreign occupation, of national unity and ultimate sacrifice for homeland 
(Serbdom) and Heavenly Kingdom. Prior to Ottoman occupation, the 
Serbs had reached their zenith under Dušan the Great (33–), who was   
crowned “Emperor of the Serbs, Greeks and Bulgars”.6
The most ardent collector of Serb oral tradition was Vuk Karadžić 
(787–864), reflecting the ideas of European early Romanticism. Nota-
bly, he was also the reformer and founder of the modern Serbian language, 
building on the work of other Serb linguists and philosophers, Sava Mrkalj 
(783–833), Luka Milovanov (784–88) and Dositej Obradović (74–
8), the latter being a representative of European rationalism. Karadžić 
3 Djordje Petrović known as Karadjordje was the leader of the First Serbian Insurrec-
tion and the founder of the Serb Karadjordjević dynasty. For more, see Zeljan E. Suster, 
Historical Dictionary of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, European Historical Diction-
aries No. 9 (Lanham, MD�London: Scarecrow Press, 999), 4.
4 Serbia lost independence only in 49, but the Battle of Kosovo was perceived as 
crucial to the establishment of the 00 years of Ottoman domination over Serbia.  It 
should be stressed that, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the capital city of 
the Serbian Kingdom and the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch were, respectively, 
Prizren and Peć, two cities in the modern-day territory of Kosovo and Metohia. 
 The Battle of Kosovo took place on St. Vitus’ Day (Vidovdan). The day of the Kosovo 
anniversary was chosen by the heir apparent to the Habsburg throne for a state visit to 
the occupied Sarajevo in 94, when he was assassinated by a local Serb activist, Gavrilo 
Princip, marking the beginning of the First World War. June 8th was also chosen by 
the ruler of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as the day on which to prom-
ulgate the Vidovdan Constitution in 9. Aware of this symbolism, Stalin chose this 
date to announce the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominforn 
in 948. The anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo has been honoured by other nations as 
well. In June 98, five months before the end of the First World War, the United States 
recognized it as a day of special commemoration in honour of Serbia and all other op-
pressed peoples fighting in the Great War. Prior to that, in 96, a nationwide tribute to 
Serbia was arranged in Britain to celebrate the anniversary of Kosovo. For more infor-
mation on these celebrations, see Thomas A. Emmert, “The Kosovo Legacy” in Kosovo, 
ed. Basil W.R. Jenkins (Alhambra, CA: The Kosovo Charity Fund, 99), -7.
6 Quoted in Frits W. Hondius, The Yugoslav Community of Nations (Hague: Mouton, 
968), 0.
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solidified Serbian culture, spreading and popularizing national awakening. 
He also extended the definition of Serbdom to embrace all who spoke this 
language, which, according to him, was a Serbian national heritage.7 This 
idea reappeared in the formation of the first Yugoslavia, but failed in prac-
tice because a common language was not sufficient to unite Serbs, Croats 
and Muslims in one nation. Moreover, the majority of Croats had strongly 
rejected Karadžić’s linguistic theory of national identity, perceiving Karadžić 
as a Serb nationalist.
In 844, an unofficial plan of Serbian foreign policy was forged, in-
spired by a leading Polish émigré in France Count Adam Jerzi Czartoryski 
and his Balkan agent Frantisek Zach who wrote the first draft of this docu-
ment. Ilija Garašanin (8–74), Serbian statesman and politician then 
serving as Minister of the Interior, personally endorsed Zach’s somewhat 
revised plan in a then secret8 document known as Načertanije (“Draft”). 
Like many of his contemporaries, Garašanin accepted that Serbia’s national 
mission was to complete the task of national and social liberation initiated 
by the Serbian insurrections of 804 and 8. The frontiers of the state 
needed to be extended to encompass all areas where Serbs lived according 
to the most famous paragraph of Načertanije:
The significance and the foundation of Serbian politics is that it not 
be limited to its present borders, but that it seeks to embrace all Serb 
peoples surrounding it.9
Following Karadžić’s lead, Garašanin defined the Serb national boundaries 
as linguistic and cultural rather than exclusively ethnic or religious. How-
ever, the Načertanije also advocated historical borders, especially towards 
the South.  
Načertanije was a national programme created after the famous na-
tional programmes in Europe demanding national liberation and union in 
nation-states, pursuant to similar processes in Germany or Italy. In fact, that 
7 Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
99), 37.
8 The Serbian public was not aware of the existence of the document until 888 and 
of its contents until the beginning of the twentieth century. See Radoš Ljušić, “Ilija 
Gapašanin o srpskoj državnosti” [Ilija Garašanin on Serb Statehood] in Garašanin: susreti 
i vidjenja 2001 [Garašanin: meetings and perceptions 00], eds. Zoran Konstantinović 
and Slobodan Pavićević (Kragujevac: Jefimija, 00), 99.
9 “Načertanije Ilije Garašanina”, reprinted in Belgrade 99,  (translation mine). 
English copy produced in Paul N. Hehn, “The Origins of Modern Pan-Serbism – the 
844 Nacertanije of Ilija Garasanin: An Analysis and Translation”, East European Quar-
terly IX, No.  (Summer 97).
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same year the project of a Greater Greece – Megali Idea – was published.0 
Both the Serbian and Greek national programmes were based on the prin-
ciple of inalienable historic right, in agreement with the national ideologies 
in Europe at the time. Serbian political parties followed this ideology within 
and without the princedoms, kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, which 
is comparable to the implementation of “internal” and “external” right to 
self-determination. The most influential Serbian party, the National Radi-
cal Party, in its 88 programme thus declared the following two goals for 
future state organization: “internally people’s prosperity and freedom, and 
externally state independence and freedom and unification of the remain-
ing parts of Serbdom.”
Later historiography, mainly of Croat origin, has wrongly accused 
Garašanin of extreme Serb nationalism. And yet, the reading of the origi-
nal text suggests a different conclusion. The section titled “The Policy of 
Servia towards Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Northern Albania” 
states that “one of the main points which should be set forth is the principle 
of full freedom of religion established by law”, and that “every effort should 
be made to protect the Bosnians and other Slavs and to render them every 
means of assistance”. Načertanije further declares: 
It would be advisable to print a short and general history of Bosnia, 
in which the names of several men of the Mohammedan faith and 
their renowned deeds would be included. It is recommended that 
this history be written in the spirit of the Slavic people. 
Garašanin was a pragmatic statesman who realized that “only through al-
liance with other neighbouring peoples can she [Serbia] solve her future 
problems”.3 While Garašnin certainly envisioned a Serb-led kingdom, at 
the same time this was to be a democratic South-Slav union. According to 
Slobodan Jovanović, Garašanin was one of the first statesmen to conceptu-
alize the idea “Balkans to the Balkan peoples”.4
In practice, union of free Serbs with the Serbs under foreign rule 
remained the Serbs’ ultimate goal. Whether this union would be achieved 
independently or in union with other Slav peoples was yet to be determined. 
Garašanin was aware that the implementation of his political programme 
0 Milan St. Protić, Uspon i pad srpske ideje [The Rise and Fall of the Serbian Idea] (Bel-
grade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 994), 68.
 Samouprava (Self-government), no. , 8 January 88 [translation mine].
 See, for instance, Mirko Valentić, “Koncepcija Garašaninovog ‘Načertanija’ (844)”, 
Historijski pregled VII (Zagreb, 96).
3 Načertanije, Appendix. 
4 Slobodan Jovanović, Političke i pravne rasprave I–III [Political and legal treatises] (st 
ed. 908; Belgrade: BIGZ, 990), 3.
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would not begin immediately but that it provided an important strategic 
vision. 
Four years after the Načertanije was written, the Slavs (mainly Serbs) 
living in the Habsburg province of South Hungary (Voivodina) allied 
themselves with Vienna not simply to counteract the Hungarian revolu-
tionaries, but primarily to protect their rights from the Hungarian denial 
of Serb identity. Their struggle was aided by the Kingdom of Serbia in an 
action organized by Garašanin, as well as by Serbs from other parts of the 
Habsburg Empire. However, the Voivodina Serbs, to their disappointment, 
were not granted territorial autonomy by Vienna in return, but just another 
imperial patent reconfirming their previous privileges.6  
The “Duchy of Serbia and Temes Banat” established on 8 November 
849 was not a separate federal unit as such but a separate administrative 
district with church and school autonomy. Under Hungarian pressure even 
this status was abolished on 7 December 860, with Voivodina becom-
ing fully incorporated into Hungary. In 868, the Hungarian authorities 
renewed the church and school autonomy for Voivodina Serbs, but limited 
in scope, only to abolish it once again in 9. The extensive limitation of 
privileges, beginning with the act of 860, stimulated political organization 
of the Voivodina Serbs, who gradually became the leaders of Serb political 
action in the Habsburg Empire.
 Voivodina (Voyvodina, Vojvodina) is the Serbian word for duchy. The province’s origi-
nal historic name is the Duchy of Serbia, shortened to Serbian Voivodina and then 
just Voivodina upon its incorporation into Serbia when the attribute “Serbian” was no 
longer necessary.
6 The Serbs moved from southern Serbia (mainly Kosovo) to Voivodina in great num-
bers in 690 to escape Ottoman retaliation, whose army they had fought together with 
the Austrians. The migration to Voivodina was initiated by an Invitational manifest 
(so-called Leterae invitatorie) issued by the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I to all Balkan 
Christians on 6 April 690.  Special privileges were granted to Serbs in Voivodina by 
Leopold I on  August 690,  December 690, 0 August 69 and 4 March 69, 
and reconfirmed by the decrees of 698 and 699, as well as with each change of the 
ruler ( Joseph I on 7 August 706, Charles VI on 0 April 7 and Maria Theresa on 
4 April 743). These privileges, allowing for church and school autonomy (including 
free election of church patriarch and military ruler – duke), exemption from 0% tax 
imposed by the Catholic Church, and guarantees of personal and property rights, were 
limited in times of peace (under pressure from the Catholic Church and Hungarian 
authorities) and extended in times of crisis since the Voivodina Serbs rendered military 
services to the Austrian rulers. For more information, see Vasilije Dj. Krestić, Gradja o 
Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji (1848–1914) [Documents on Serbs in Croatia and Sla-
vonia (848–94)] (Belgrade: BIGZ, 99), 88-.
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Serbia liberated its Southern territory (Old Serbia and Slavic Mace-
donia)7 from the Ottoman Turks in the First Balkan War (9–3), but 
then fought a second Balkan war to determine her borders in relation to 
other Balkan states, primarily Bulgaria, which resulted in the Treaty of Bu-
charest of 0 August 93.8 During that period the Serbian government 
made no overt attempts to undermine Austro-Hungarian rule, aware that 
Serbia was not strong enough to fight the Empire on her own. However, 
the relations with Austria-Hungary became increasingly strained, especially 
after 908 when the Dual Monarchy annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose 
relative majority population at that time was Serb.9 Perceiving the Serbs as 
the greatest threat to the Empire’s integrity30 and an obstacle to its expan-
sion to the East (Drang nach Osten), the Habsburgs used the assassination 
of the archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo as a pretext for the punitive 
war against Serbia.
According to Jovanović, in Serbia at the turn of the twentieth century 
“the strongest idea-force was nationalism”, which he identifies as a positive 
force contributing to Serbia’s state building: 
The people needed an independent state in order to liberate them-
selves from the Turks; the dynasty needed a strong state power for 
its security; the parties needed a constitutional and parliamentary 
state system in order to govern. Feeding itself on the components of 
nationalism, dynastism, partyism, the state idea grew stronger.3
7 Old Serbia is a geographic region that was the core of medieval Serbia, including 
Raška, Kosovo and Metohia, as well as the northwest of today’s Slavic Macedonia, 
including the towns of Skoplje, Veles and Tetovo.
8 Treaty of Bucharest, 0 August 93, 8 CTS 3-337.
9 See Dimitrije Djordjevic, “The Serbs as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor”, 
Austrian History Yearbook 3, No.  (967), 48-8, 7-74.
30 Samuel R. Williamson, Jr, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War 
(London: Macmillan, 99), 03. 
3 Jovanović, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića, 374. Note: The Obrenović dynasty ruled in 
8–4 and 88–903, and the Karadjordjević dynasty in 84–8 and 903–4. The 
two rival dynasties were both native, Serb. Prince Miloš Obrenović organized the 87 
assassination of Karadjordje. An arbitrary ruler, Miloš was forced to abdicate in 839. 
He was succeeded by two of his sons, Milan (who ruled only a few weeks) and Michael, 
who ruled for three years. In 84 Karadjordje’s son Alexander (806–8) acceded to 
the throne, but was deposed in 88, when the Obrenović dynasty was reinstalled and 
Prince Miloš came to the throne for the second time. Prince Michael Obrenović (8–
68), the youngest son of Miloš, engineered the total Ottoman withdrawal from Serbia 
in 867. However, after his assassination in 868, his first cousin Milan (84–90) 
was elected Prince of Serbia (King from 88) and ruled until 889 when he abdicated 
in favour of his son Alexander, the last ruler of the Obrenović dynasty (88–903).
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As a result, the early twentieth century saw Serbia as a relatively modern 
and functional parliamentary monarchy. The 903 Constitution (the revised 
888 one) reinaugurated a democratic regime, with strong guarantees for 
political and human rights, building upon the 838 Constitution, which en-
forced a separation of executive and judicial powers, the 869 Constitution, 
which strengthened the role of the National Assembly, and the 888 Con-
stitution, which granted the National Assembly complete control over the 
budget, establishing a parliamentary regime.3 Public administration reform 
and a professional civil service were important building blocks of a modern 
Serb state, with many civil servants coming from the ranks of Austro-Hun-
garian Serbs. By the First World War, almost universal male suffrage had 
existed for at least a generation in Serbia (from the 888 Constitution) and 
social rights equalled if not exceeded those of West-European states; work-
ing time was limited and workers enjoyed the right to strike.  
As observed by John Allcock, “measured by the standard of the ex-
istence of representative institutions alone, Serbia should be considered 
the most ‘advanced’ of all the South Slav lands”.33 This is not to say that 
Serbia lacked non-democratic elements. Notably, in 903 a secret society 
largely composed of military officers murdered the autocratic King Alexan-
der Obrenović and Queen Draga, considering the couple to be a political 
embarrassment to Serbia and an obstacle to her democratization. Still, the 
subsequent Serb ruler, King Peter I Karadjordjević, was a true constitutional 
monarch, who had in his youth translated John Stuart Mill’s essay On Lib-
erty into Serbian.34 In the nineteenth century Serbia created a modern army 
and a civilian bureaucracy, making a unique achievement in what was to 
become Yugoslavia, that of building the framework for a modern state.3
Development of Croat national movement and 
Croato-Serb relations until 1914
As in the case of the Serbs, language and literature became the building 
blocks of Croat national consciousness in the nineteenth century. Ljudevit 
3 See Jovanović, Političke i pravne rasprave, 0-3.
33 John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia University Press, 000), 
63.
34 Grandson of Karadjordje Petrović, the leader of the First Serbian Insurrection against 
the Ottomans, King Peter I was a modest person and a patriot, Serb and European, 
having fought in the French army against the Germans and wounded in 870, as well as 
taking part in the 876 Serb uprising against the Ottomans in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
3 See John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country (Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 996), 46-.
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Gaj (809–7) led this language reform, modifying the Latin alphabet to 
partially conform to the rule “one sound–one letter”, established for the 
Cyrillic alphabet by Vuk Karadžić. Gaj also adopted the shtokavian dialect 
of the Serbian language as the Croat literary dialect.36 His reform was an es-
sential part of the so-called Illyrian movement, resisting the attempts from 
Budapest to Magyarize the Croats and entertaining the idea of a common 
“Illyrian” (that is, South Slav) state. Serbs, including Garašanin, mistrust-
ed Ljudevit Gaj and therefore questioned the authenticity of the Illyrian 
movement, having discovered that Gaj also acted as a spy for the Viennese 
authorities.37
In contrast to Slovene and Serb nationalism, which mainly relate to 
people, Croat nationalism principally relates to territory, a policy which has 
over time become the root of competing claims between the two nations 
that inhabit present-day Croatia – the Croats and the Serbs:  
While Serbian nationalism was fashioned so as to appeal to the 
minds and hearts of all Serbian people, regardless of where they 
lived, Croatian nationalism, largely legalistic, was predicated on 
territorial claims, without taking account of who lived in these ter-
ritories.38
Historically, “Croatia” has been an amorphous geographic concept, signifi-
cantly changing in size and ownership of sovereignty. It existed as a small 
independent state in the Middle Ages,39 but it was absorbed by the Hun-
garian Kingdom following the death of the last Croatian king in a battle 
against Hungarians in 097. Croatia became one of many provinces, ad-
ministratively linked with the province of Slavonia, most of which forms 
part of present-day Croatia. A third formerly Habsburg province which also 
forms part of present-day Croatia, but which, historically, has been more 
autonomous than the original province of Croatia or the province of Sla-
vonia, is Dalmatia. Austrians ruled Dalmatia, while Hungary administered 
Croatia and Slavonia in the Empire. Finally, the fourth region incorporated 
36 For more, see Suster, Historical Dictionary of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 8-
9.
37 See Vasilije Dj. Krestić, Znameniti Srbi o Hrvatima [Eminent Serbs on Croats] (Novi 
Sad: Prometej, 999), 8-9.
38 Žarko Bilbija, “The Serbs and Yugoslavia” in The Serbs and their National Interest, eds. 
Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman and Dusan T. Batakovic (San Francisco: Serbian Unity 
Congress, 997), 96-97. Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina is another territory of compet-
ing claims between Croats and Serbs but this important issue will not be discussed here 
due to the limited space.
39 Medieval Croatia reached its peak in the reign of Tomislav (90–98), who pro-
claimed himself king in 94.
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into today’s Croatia is Krajina or the Military Frontier, ruled by the Austri-
ans until 88 when it was placed under Hungarian auspices.40
Dalmatia certainly enjoyed the largest degree of autonomy in the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It entered the Habsburg monarchy much 
later than the other South-Slav provinces, as a result of the Congress of 
Vienna in 8, when it was taken from Napoleonic France. Indeed, Dal-
matia retained a distinctive character during most of its history, not unified 
with the other Austro-Hungarian provinces inhabited by South-Slavs until 
the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes more than a 
hundred years after the Habsburg conquest (98). According to Allcock: 
“Although Croats had tended to include Dalmatia within their understand-
ing of the historical ‘Croat lands’, these had long been Venetian posses-
sions.” Moreover, the Ragusan Republic (Dubrovnik) had retained relative 
independence until 808. By the Treaty of Campo Formio (797), Venice 
ceded Dalmatia to Austria and, following the intervening Napoleonic pe-
riod, Austrian control was reasserted in 8.4
In 874 Dalmatia’s population was mostly made up of Croats and 
Serbs, with a small Italian minority, which nevertheless had significant cul-
tural influence.4 The exact proportions of Serbs and Croats cannot be pre-
cisely determined. Historians at the time made estimates based on language 
and religion, and while language was considered to be one and the same, 
Serb Catholics were also a large group in Dalmatia.43 Serbs lived mostly 
in the south of Dalmatia, in the Bay of Kotor (Cattaro) and in Dubrovnik. 
They were also to be found in the towns of Zadar and Šibenik and in the 
40 The peninsula of Istria is sometimes studied as a separate, fifth region although most 
historians tend to group Istria with Dalmatia.
4 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, .
4 According to one historian, Rade Petrović, Nacionalno pitanje u Dalmaciji u XIX 
stoljeću [National question in Dalmatia in the 9th Century] (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, and 
Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 98), 7-8, “89 percent of the population of Dalmatia spoke only 
Serbo-Croatian in 874; about 8 percent spoke both Serbo-Croatian and Italian; 3 per-
cent spoke only Italian”, quoted in Nicholas J. Miller, Between Nation and State (Pitts-
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 997), 9. For more, see Vasilije Krestić, History 
of the Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia 1848–1914, transl. Margot and Boško Milosavljević 
(Belgrade: BIGZ, 997). 
43 For more information on Roman Catholic Serbs, see Lazo M. Kostić, Katolički Srbi 
[Catholic Serbs] (Toronto: St. Sava Serb Cultural Club, 963) and Ivan Stojanović, 
Povjest Dubrovačke Republike [The History of the Republic of Dubrovnik], orig. written 
in German by Ivan Hristijan v. Engel (Dubrovnik: Srpske Dubrovačke Štamparije A. 
Pasarića, 903). 
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hinterland of northern Dalmatia.44 The Serb presence in Dalmatia and its 
hinterland is centuries old. In addition to some older historical documents, 
living witnesses to Serb presence are the Serbian Orthodox monasteries of 
Krupa and Krka (both dated to the fourteenth century). A brief account 
of economic, cultural, scientific and political influence of the Dubrovnik 
Serbs is an illustrative example of the significant Serb presence in southern 
Dalmatia:
For many centuries Dubrovnik traded with its Orthodox hinterland 
and received immigrants therefrom. The most renowned inhabit-
ants of Dubrovnik, Ivan Gundulić, poet (83–638) and Rudjer 
Bošković, scientist and philosopher (73–787), famous in Euro-
pean circles, were of Serbian origin ... In 890, the Serbian Party 
won the municipal election in Dubrovnik. They got votes of the 
Orthodox Serbs and of the Catholic Serbs as well. In Ston, on the 
Pelješac peninsula, St. Sava founded an eparchy in 9.4
Three nations therefore claimed this region – Serbs, Croats and Italians. Yet 
it should be noted that prior to and under Habsburg rule, many Dalma-
tians identified themselves simply as Dalmatians or Slavs, rather than Serbs, 
Croats or Italians.46  
Krajina47 is the region established by Vienna in the 0s as a mili-
tary frontier zone between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, on empty 
land bordering the provinces of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia to the west 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the east. The people who came to inhabit this 
region, predominantly Serb,48 fought for the Habsburgs against the Ot-
tomans. In return, they enjoyed a large degree of autonomy that included 
independent schooling and an autonomous church. Slavo-Serbian (the lan-
44 Serbs began to settle in the coastal city of Rijeka only after the Second World War, 
following the expulsion of most of its Italian inhabitants by the Yugoslav Communist 
authorities.  
4 Jovan Ilić, “The Serbs in the Former SR Croatia” in The Serbian Question in the Bal-
kans, 37.
46 As late as 860, a Dalmatian politician reported no more than seven pro-Slavic poli-
ticians in Dalmatia, further noting that several of these declared themselves as Slavo-
Dalmatians, also considering Dalmatians to be a separate ethnic group. For more, see 
Josip Vrandečić, “Nacionalne ideologije u Dalmaciji u 9. stoljeću” [National ideologies 
in Dalmatia in the 9th century] in Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara [Dialogue of histori-
ans 4], eds. Dušan Gamser, Igor Graovac and Olivera Milosavljević (Zagreb: Friedrich 
Naumann Stiftung, 00).
47 Military Border or Frontier in English; Militärgrenze in German.
48 For one of the earliest autochthonous demographic accounts of Krajina, see Spiridon 
Jović, Etnografska slika Slavonske vojne granice [Ethnographic Picture of the Military 
Border in Slavonia] (st ed. 83; Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 004), esp. 43-48.
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guage that pre-dates the current version of the Serbian language) was used 
as a language of instruction, and Serb Orthodox clergy oversaw schools 
in Krajina. It was the Statuta Valachorum,49 a decree issued by Emperor 
Ferdinand II in 630, that placed Krajina under the direct rule of Vienna, 
removing the jurisdiction of the Croatian Diet and effectively creating a 
separate region at the expense of the Croatia-Slavonia province. Internal 
organization of the Krajina was based on local autonomy, with courts for 
each of three captaincies, elected for year-long terms by the elders of each 
district. This civil government and courts were in charge of all civil penal-
ties, with military courts limited to corporal punishment, and that only for 
the military. The Statute also elaborated military requirements: a minimum 
of six thousand soldiers was to gather within three hours of any alarm. The 
Krajina inhabitants were exempt from various land and protection taxes 
imposed on others.0 
Upon the creation of Krajina, Croatian noblemen demanded that 
their levy power be extended to this area. In the eighteenth century, the 
Croatian representatives in the Hungarian Diet even demanded “the en-
actment of laws and regulations which would make life impossible for the 
Serbian people and for the Orthodox Church” such as those preventing 
the organization of Serbian high schools, the building of Serb Orthodox 
churches, and so on. However, Vienna rejected these demands, needing the 
Krajina manpower to fight the Ottoman onslaught. In turn, the inhabitants 
of Krajina were extremely loyal to the Habsburgs, regarding them as the 
guarantors of their privileged status. According to Gunther Rothenberg:
At the time when serfdom and subservience to feudal lords were still 
the general rule, [they] regarded themselves as free tenants of the 
emperor who were far superior to ordinary peasants.  
49 The legislation had the same name and purpose as the so-called Vlach law of 467–8, 
under which the Ottomans granted privileges to Serbs in vassal Serbia. However the 
Austro-Hungarian law granted more extensive rights, at once creating an autonomous 
region and an effective military system defending their Empire. The integral text of the 
Statuta Valachorum, proclaimed on  October 630, is reproduced in Latin, Serbian and 
English in Dinko Davidov, Srpske priviliegije [Serbian Privileges], (Novi Sad, Belgrade: 
Matica srpska, Institute for Balkan Studies, Svetovi, 994), 4-47.
0 Miller, Between Nation and State, 0-.
 Edmond Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia. A Record of Racial and Religious Prosecu-
tions and Massacres (Chicago: American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 96), .
 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740–1881 (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 966), 9.
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However, the Austrians tended to overlook local derogations to privileges 
at a time of a low war danger. The Catholic Church used this to forcefully 
convert the residents of the Military Frontier: 
As long as the service of the Orthodox Grenzer were needed, their 
religion was respected; but when the need had passed the throne 
did nothing to restrain the efforts of the Catholic hierarchy, which, 
with the zealous collaboration of the military, attempted forcibly to 
convert the Orthodox or at least to coerce them to accept the Uniate 
rites.3
Despite the forced conversions, and the taxing demands of the Croat noble-
men, the Serbs and the Croats generally lived peacefully in Krajina, where 
Serbs were a majority.4 The Krajina Serbs also had good relations with other 
Habsburg provinces where Croats formed the majority – Croatia, Slavonia 
and Dalmatia. Serious scholars have therefore refuted the postulated “age-
old antagonisms” between Serbs and Croats.
The Croats of Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed a limited political autonomy 
from the Habsburgs from their official incorporation into the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy in 0. However, many present-day Croat historians 
find the position of Croatia’s subservience to Hungary in the Habsburg 
Empire (later Austria-Hungary) impossible to accept, because it testifies to 
the loss of Croatian statehood in the Middle Ages. Contrary to the estab-
lished scholarly evidence, they tend to describe the Croat position within 
the Dual Monarchy as a voluntary sharing of power and a personal union 
between Croatia and Hungary: “In the early Middle-Ages Croatia entered 
into something of a commonwealth with Hungary.”6
Some Croat historians go beyond this explanation and depict Croatia 
as one of the three states constituting the Habsburg Empire which, accord-
3 Ibid., 9. Please note that Grenzer is the German term for the Krajina inhabitants.
4 See Drago Roksandić, Srbi u Hrvatskoj [Serbs in Croatia] (Zagreb: Vjesnik, 99), 
-70.
 See, e.g., Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 30.
6 Stephen Gazi, A History of Croatia (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 993), ix. 
A document titled Pacta Conventa, not preserved but supposedly signed in 0, was 
claimed by leading Croatian historians to be a contract stipulating personal union of 
Hungary and Croatia. However, even if its authenticity were accepted, it still would not 
represent anything more than a contract between the feudal ruler of Croatia, Hungarian 
King Koloman, and his Croatian vassals, i.e. it would not be perceived as an interstate 
agreement in the domain of international law. Marko Kostrenčić, s. v. “Pacta conventa”, 
Enciklopedija Jugoslavije (Zagreb, 9), 404; Nada Kalić, “Pacta conventa ili tobožnji 
ugovor između plemstva dvanaestoro plemena i kralja Kolomana 0. godine” [Pacta 
conventa or the alleged contract between twelve tribes and king Koloman of 0], 
Historijski pregled  (960). 
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ing to them, was only nominally a “Dual” monarchy.7 Historical legalism 
based on the continuity of the Croat state8 is characteristic of Croatian 
historiography,9 and it follows in many aspects, and is a reaction to, similar 
Hungarian designs. Croatian historical legalism was rejected by the Hun-
garian and other historians such as Hondius who viewed it as “a complex 
and national malaise [of the Croats].”60 Nevertheless it is important to em-
phasize the firm belief of most Croats in its factuality since nationhood 
tends to be based on belief rather than reality.6 The belief in the idea that 
Croatian statehood had never been extinguished contributed to the emer-
gence of modern Croat national consciousness in the nineteenth century, 
with a goal of reunification of the alleged Triune Kingdom of the Middle 
Ages (Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia).
An undisputable fact is that Habsburg rule was less oppressive than 
Ottoman, sharing Roman Catholic religion and cultural views with the 
Croats who retained the institutions of a parliament and a governor (ban), 
who was nevertheless chosen by Vienna or Budapest, which also had full 
control of the provinces’ finances.6 Nonetheless, according to Singleton, 
dominant Croat families did not display any strong national feelings, Croat 
or Hungarian:
They were more concerned with the consolidation of their estates 
and with the expansion of their personal power. Two of the leading 
families, the Zrinski and the Frankopan, held land in both Croatia-
7 See, e.g., Milan Vladisavljević, Hrvatska autonomija pod Austro-Ugarskom [Croatian 
autonomy under Austria-Hungary] (Belgrade: Politika AD, 939).
8 See also Emilio Pallua, “A Survey of the Constitutional History of the Kingdom of 
Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia”, Canadian-American Slavic Studies 4 (990), 9-
4.
9 Croato-American historians Charles and Barbara Jelavich share the Croat viewpoint 
that Croatia and Hungary “remained as separate kingdoms united through the crown”. 
Rather than having been conquered, Croats had, in this view, “elected the ruler of Hun-
gary as their monarch” in 0, and, by the same reasoning, in 7 “after the defeat of 
Hungary by the Turks, Croatia elected the Habsburg emperor as her king”. See Charles 
and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920 (st 
edition 986; Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 993), 47.
60 Hondius, Yugoslav Community of Nations, 0
6 See Benedict R. OG. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 983); Maria N. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 997).
6 Charles Jelavich, “The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire in the Nineteenth 
Century”, Austrian History Yearbook 3, No.  (967), 00.
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Slavonia region and Hungary and moved freely between their 
lands.63 
However, an era of centralization and Magyarization ensuing in the late 
nineteenth century placed Croatia-Slavonia under the direct rule of Buda-
pest: 
The railways were being constructed as an integral part of the Hun-
garian railway system. Also, Hungarian flags, emblems, coats of 
arms, and inscriptions were being erected everywhere.64
Croat nationalists from Croatia and Slavonia developed an increasing an-
imosity towards the Hungarians, whom they then viewed as oppressors, 
while others remained loyal to Budapest.  
It was not until the nineteenth century that the provinces of Croatia 
and Slavonia had a first governor of Croatian origin, Josip Jelačić, previ-
ously a mid-ranking Austrian military officer. Jelačić entertained a good re-
lationship with the Habsburg Serbs. He referred to the “Croat and Serbian 
People” in his proclamations, and declared on 7 September 848: “Religious 
differences make no barriers between brothers in social or public life. We 
proclaim full equality [between Croats and Serbs].”6  
When the Hungarians began to demand greater rights from the Aus-
trian Habsburgs, the Croats and the Serbs in the Empire, led by Ban Jelačić, 
fought fervently on the Austrian side. Croats, who were under Hungar-
ian rule in the Empire, resisted Magyarization and hoped to obtain greater 
rights from the Austrian emperor. The Krajina Serbs supported the Croats 
not only because of Jelačić’s fair treatment of Serbs and Croats, but also 
because the Hungarians had begun encroaching on the Austrian rule in 
Krajina. Finally, the Hungarians had directed their Magyarization policy 
not just against Croats but also against Serbs and other ethnic groups in the 
provinces under their rule. A key factor in forging a Croato-Serb military 
coalition against the Hungarians was the uprising of the Voivodina Serbs 
(then a part of Southern Hungary) against the Hungarian authorities during 
the 848–49 revolution.66 The Krajina Serbs demanded that Jelačić provide 
military aid for their brethren. The Serb Patriarch Josif Rajačić, who had 
consecrated Jelačić as a ban, seconded this demand.67 Although the Croat-
63 Singleton, Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples, -6.
64 Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 
1919–1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 99), 3.
6 Branko Vincic, “History of Serbs in Croatia”, Krajina: Tragedy of a People (Hamilton, 
ON: Canadian-Serbian Council, 998), 4.
66 See above.
67 Rothenberg, Military Border, .
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Serb army then delivered a serious blow to the Hungarian forces, they lost 
the battle.  The Hungarian revolution was quelled by Russian troops who 
aided the Austrian crown, bound by the Holy Alliance.68
The good relations between the Serbs and the Croats in the Habsburg 
Empire were further strengthened in 867, when the Croatian Diet declared 
that the Serbian and Croatian nations and their languages were equal.69 
However, this decision was not always respected. Notably the first Croat 
teachers’ general assembly in 87 concluded that teaching was to be in 
Croatian only.70 Perhaps this change in attitude came as a result of the 868 
Croato-Hungarian agreement (Nagodba).7 The agreement dealing with 
Croato-Hungarian relations was a consequence of the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise of 867, which had turned the Habsburg Monarchy into a 
Dual Monarchy, now placing the province of Croatia-Slavonia completely 
in the sphere of Hungary. 
The Croato-Hungarian agreement delineated Croatian autonomy 
within Hungary with Croatian as the official language. Yet it stressed in 
the first article that Hungary and the provinces of Croatia, Slavonia and 
Dalmatia formed “one and the same political community”,7 with Budapest 
retaining control over the choice of governor, finances and the most impor-
tant port, Fiume (Rijeka). While Croats placed their hopes in this agree-
ment, perceiving it as a document apt to strengthen their rights within the 
Empire, Hungarians considered it a first step in Croatia’s transformation 
68 Article II of the Holy Alliance Treaty, signed on 6 September 8 by the sovereigns 
of Austria, Prussia and Russia, stipulated that “the sole principle of force, whether be-
tween the said Governments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other 
reciprocal service, and of testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with 
which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the 
same Christian nation.” Edward Cecil Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London, 
87) (accessed 0 February 00); available from http:��www.napoleonseries.org�ref-
erence�diplomatic�alliance.cfm
69 Saborski spisi sabora kraljevinah Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije od godine 1865–1867 
[Parliamentary Acts of the Parliament of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Sla-
vonia 86–87] (Zagreb, 900), 308.
70 Decision quoted in Vasilije Dj. Krestić, Iz istorije Srba i srpsko-hrvatskih odnosa [From 
the History of Serbs and Serb-Croat Relations] (Belgrade: BIGZ, 994), 0-.
7 Integral text of the political compromise between Croatia and Hungary of 8 No-
vember 868 reproduced in François Rodolphe, Les Constitutions Modernes–Recueil des 
constitutions en vigeur dans les divers Etats d’Europe, d’Amérique et du monde civilisé (Paris: 
Challamel, 90), Vol. I, 0, and in Snezana Trifunovska,      Yugoslavia through Documents 
from its Creation to its Dissolution (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 994), 0-8.
7 Ibid. (translation mine). Original text: “La Hongrie et la Croatie, Slavonie et Dalma-
tie forment une seule et même communauté politique…” 
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into an integral part of Hungary. Hungarian and other foreign historians, 
including those writing in that period,73 constantly emphasized the limits 
to Croatia’s autonomy within Hungary, while Croatian historians tended to 
exaggerate its scope.74 Notably, just as Hungarians wanted to render Croats 
a Hungarian “political nation”, Croats preferred to view the Serbs as ‘politi-
cal Croats’, a view that Serbs fiercely rejected.7 This issue formed the core of 
Croato-Serb antagonism, which developed as Croatian nationalism ripened 
in the second half of the nineteenth century.     
Consequently, Croatia’s frustrations regarding its position in the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were not soothed with the Nagodba. Thirteen 
years later (88), the Habsburgs dissolved the Krajina province under great 
pressure from Hungary, incorporating it into Croatia-Slavonia. From that 
point, after the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 878 diminished the 
importance of Krajina’s role in the defence of the Empire’s eastern borders, 
the Serbs become an important factor in the Croato-Hungarian conflict:  
With the new lands, Croatia added 6 percent more territory and 
663,000 more people, of which  percent were Serbs.  This simple 
transfer of land and people from one jurisdiction to another upset 
the equilibrium of Croatian politics by inserting a non-Croatian 
element into what had been a largely Croatian land. By 90, Or-
thodox Serbs made up approximately  percent of Croatia [-Slavo-
nia-]’s population.76
While the majority of the Serbs living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
were peasants, some were also bankers and wealthy landowners. In 897, 
Serbian farmers’ collectives began to be formed in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, providing small-scale aid in the form of seeds, feed, educational 
materials, and classes to Serbian peasants. Linking all the collectives was 
the Serbian Bank and the influential Serbian Economic Society with its 
newspaper, Privrednik (The Tradesman), seated in Zagreb. Started in 888, 
73 See, e.g., Hungary of Today, ed. Percy Alden (London: Fawside House, 909), 394.
74 See, e.g., Gazi, History of Croatia, ix.
7 See Tihomir Cipek, “Oblikovanje hrvatskoga nacionalnog identiteta. Primordijalni 
identitetski kod u ranoj hrvatskoj političkoj misli” [Shaping of Croatian national identi-
ty. Primordial identity code in early Croatian political thought] in Dijalog povjesničara-
istoričara; Mirjana Gross and Agneza Szabo, Prema hrvatskome gradjanskom društvu. 
Društveni razvoj u civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina 19. 
stoljeća (Zagreb, 99), 9-7.
76 Miller, Between Nation and State, 8. Importantly, Serbs constituted absolute majority 
in more than a dozen towns and a relative majority in many more. See “Popis žitelja od 
3. prosinca 90. u Kraljevinama Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji” [Census of 3 December 90 
in the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia] in Publikacije Kr. zemaljskog statističkog ureda 
u Zagrebu LXIII (Zagreb, 94), 0-.
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it was devoted to economic education and general advancement of Serbs 
who dominated Croatia’s economy until 94.77  
The Matica Srpska, Serbian scholarly and cultural organization, was 
founded in Budapest in 86, but subsequently transferred to Novi Sad 
(Voivodina), the hub of Serb publishing activities. However, while promot-
ing Serb interests, the Serb banks, cultural institutions and party organiza-
tions, according to Miller, also “served to segregate Serbs from their neigh-
bours and inculcate an insular sense of community”.78
Anxious about the termination of Krajina in 88, the Serbs received 
reassurances from Emperor Francis Joseph that “all measures have been 
taken to place [the inhabitants of Krajina] on equal status with all other 
inhabitants of [Habsburg] lands of the Hungarian crown”.79 In return for 
the preservation of their previous privileges, the Serbs opted for loyalty to 
the Hungarian governor of Croatia-Slavonia, Count Charles Khuen-Hé-
dérvary (88–903). Khuen-Hédérvary began a divide-and-rule policy in 
the region by granting greater privileges to the Serbs. In directly placing 
the Hungarian government rather than the Croatian Diet in the service of 
Serbian interests, Khuen-Hédérvary drew Serbs into the Hungarian, rather 
than Croatian, administrative context. In 887 and 888, the Parliament 
passed two laws, one legalizing the use of the Serbian language and Cyrillic 
alphabet, and the other assuring the existence of Serbian Orthodox schools 
in the districts where Serbs were a majority.80 Many Serbs were dissatisfied 
with the scope of these laws, which they believed to be less generous than 
the privileges granted to Serbs in 868, emphasizing religious and cultural 
rather than national rights.8 The 887�8 legislation was imprecise and it 
did not apply to the entire territory of the Serb-inhabited provinces. For in-
stance, the 887 “Law regulating the activities of the Eastern Greek Church 
and the use of Cyrillic” stipulated that the Cyrillic alphabet could be used in 
court proceedings “there where Serbs live in greater numbers”.8
Count Khuen-Hédérvary’s actions generated a strong Croatian op-
position.  He was portrayed as a tyrant in Croatian historiography, although 
77 All these organizations were founded by members of the Serbian Independent Party.
78 Miller, Between Nation and State, 4.
79 Document quoted in Rothenberg, Military Border, 9.
80 Miller, Between Nation and State, 37.
8 See Žarko Miladinović, Tumač povlastica, zakona, uredaba i drugih naredjenja srpske 
narodne crkvene avtonomije u Ugarskoj, Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji [Interpretation of privileg-
es, laws, decrees and other orders of the Serb national church autonomy in Hungary, 
Croatia and Slavonia] (Novi Sad, 897), 00-0. 
8 Article 3, Law regulating the activities of the Eastern Greek Church and the use of 
Cyrillic, passed on 4 May 887, produced in Krestić, Gradja, 89.
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“during the entire twenty years of his rule exactly one man was shot”.83 The 
Croatian nationalism that developed very timidly in resistance to Hungar-
ian rule, aiming at the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, the Military Frontier 
(Krajina), Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina into a single state accord-
ing to a national programme drafted by Janko Drašković in 83,84 was 
rapidly enhanced by Khuen-Hedervary’s actions – and directed against the 
Serbs who agreed to the ban’s concessions hopeful to preserve their own 
culture represented by the Christian Orthodox faith and Cyrillic alphabet. 
According to Miller:
Serbs’ behaviour in Croatia was rooted in their fear of losing their 
collective identity. They were conscious of their history and proud 
that they had maintained their identity through centuries of Otto-
man and Habsburg administration.  ... [They] could do nothing but 
accept Khuen-Hedervary’s patronage, given the attitude of the most 
popular Croatian political parties and their leaders.8
Croatian politics became one of resisting the granting of any recognition to 
Serbian institutions and cultural peculiarity without previous acceptance by 
Serbs of the concept that the only “political nation” in Croatia was the Cro-
atian.86 This politics was emanated by the extreme nationalist Ante Starčević 
(83–96) and the Croatian Party of Rights.  
 Starčević, like many other Croat intellectuals, believed that Croatian 
statehood had never been extinguished, that the “Croatian state” had merely 
been ruled by foreigners. According to him, this state encompassed all the 
Illyrian provinces of the Roman Empire, and was inhabited exclusively by 
Croats. Starčević not only denied any claim to Serbian nationhood, but even 
argued that members of the medieval Serbian Nemanjić dynasty had been 
the “purest-blooded Croats”.87  
Starčević turned fiercely anti-Serb after failing to obtain professor-
ship at the University of Belgrade and from then on regarded Serbs as a 
political preference, an inferior race amidst the Croats that either was to 
abandon its national consciousness and become Croat or to be exterminat-
ed. Not only did Starčević launch the slogan “The Serbs are a breed fit only 
for the slaughter house”,88 but he also claimed Slovenes as ethnic Croats. 
He aspired towards a Greater Croatia that would encompass Slovenia, the 
83 Hondius, Yugoslav Community of Nations, 7.
84 See Gazi, History of Croatia, 79.
8 Miller, Between Nation and State, 4.
86 Ibid.
87 Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974 (London: C. Hurst and 
Company, 977), 3.
88 Paris, Genocide, .
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provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Krajina, as well as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In brief, Starčević was “the progenitor of extreme Croatian 
nationalism, which sought to suppress and perhaps even to exterminate all 
those who had a different national consciousness”.89 Despite overwhelming 
historical evidence to the contrary, however, modern Croat historians have 
identified Starčević as one of Croatian most eminent liberals, enlightened 
by the ideals of the French Revolution and committed to democracy and 
the rule of law.90
Another ideology that emanated from Croatian resistance to 
Magyarization was the Croat version of Yugoslavism, which foresaw union          
of South Slavs into one, highly federalized, region based on the alleged 
historical rights. The goal was not independence but autonomy in the form 
of a separate federal unit dominated by Croats. The champion of this ideol-
ogy was Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who had also briefly contemplated 
unification of the South-Slav lands of the Dual Monarchy with Serbia in 
the mid-860s. 
Serb politics in the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the beginning of 
the twentieth century was divided between those supporting cooperation 
with the Croats (the Independents), and those who supported some coop-
eration but insisted on forming an entity separate from the Croats in the 
future and joining with the Kingdom of Serbia (the Radicals).
The Independent Serbian Party (later the Serbian National Indepen-
dent Party) was founded in August 88 as the first Serbian opposition 
party in Croatia, demanding Serbian church and school autonomy, budget-
ary support for Serbian institutions in Croatia, equality of the Cyrillic with 
the Latin alphabet, the right to fly the Serbian flag, and a revision of the 
agreement with Hungary.9 The party’s leader, Svetozar Pribićević, was the 
most active and influential Serb politician in Croatia from late 90. Born 
in Kostajnica in Krajina, he was brought up in such a way as “to have deep 
devotion toward the Serbian national idea and fully uncritical love towards 
Serbia, Montenegro and Russia”.9 His party advocated a broader version of 
Serbdom seeing Serbs as part of a larger, Serbo-Croatian nation.
A more vocal party, the Serbian National Radical Party, came into 
force in 887. It was not active in the entire province of Croatia-Slavonia, 
which then included Krajina, but based its political activity on the privileges 
89 Djilas, Contested Country, 06-07.
90 See Pavo Barišić, “Ante Starčević (83–896)” in Liberalna misao u Hrvatskoj [Liber-
al Idea in Croatia], eds. Andrea Feldman, Vladimir Stipetić and Franjo Zenko (Zagreb: 
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 000), 0-0.
9 Miller, Between Nation and State, 38.
9 Ibid., 47.
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granted to Serbs by the earlier Habsburg monarchs. The party goal was 
to extend the Serbian church and school autonomy to the political realm, 
building a basis for Serb territorial autonomy. According to the Radicals’ 
Autonomy Programme of 897, Serbs should seek “the right of autonomy 
not only in the church�school and property�financial [fields] but also in the 
political arena”.93 The Radicals based their claims on the set of privileges 
granted by Habsburg Emperor Leopold I in 690, refusing the changes 
introduced by the subsequent Croato-Hungarian agreement. According to 
Miller, the Serbian Radical Party, led by Jaša Tomić, “represented a tried and 
true version of Serbianness: that the Serbian community was [Christian] 
Orthodox, isolated, threatened with assimilation, and needful of vigilance”.94 
This vigilance developed in response to Magyarization and the Croats’ in-
creasing denial of Serbian identity
In September 90, Srbobran (Serb-Defender), newspaper published 
by the Independent Serbian Party, reprinted an article titled “Serbs and Cro-
ats” from Srpski književni glasnik (Serbian Literary Herald), the leading lit-
erary journal in the Kingdom of Serbia. This article by a young Serb student 
from Bosnia argued that the Serbs, having a stronger culture, would eventu-
ally culturally absorb the Croats. It caused a great uproar among the Croats, 
who protested in Zagreb, looting and destroying many Serbian banks and 
businesses.9 The extent of the violence shocked the Serbs across the Em-
pire.96
Three years after this incident, however, a small group of enlight-
ened Serbs and Croats formed an official political coalition, realizing that 
Magyarization threatened them both and that the Viennese authorities did 
not support a further federalization of the Empire. Thus, at the turn of the 
century, a policy of Croato-Serb cooperation prevailed, born out of the 897 
unification of the Croat and Serb youth organizations into the United Cro-
atian and Serbian Youth. The youth leaders later formed parties that entered 
into a Serbo-Croatian government coalition, reflecting Pribićević’s belief 
that “the Serbo-Croatian conflict cannot be considered a national question, 
because Serbs and Croats are not two different nations but parts of one and 
the same nation”.97  
93 Quoted in Miller, Between Nation and State, 40.
94 Ibid., .
9 Ibid., -4.
96 See correspondence of Serb notables describing the 90 riots, reproduced in Krestić, 
Gradja, 333-337.
97 Svetozar Pribićević, “Misao vodilja Srba i Hrvata” [Guiding Idea of Serbs and Croats] 
in Jovan Banjanin et al., Narodna misao (Zagreb: Dionička tiskara, 897), 0.
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One of the goals of the Croato-Serb coalition was unification of 
Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia, with the purpose of strengthening the 
struggle against the Austro-Hungarian dominance. Concerned about the 
previous nationalist Croatian policy, the Serbs joined the Coalition under 
one important condition, contained in the Zadar Resolution:
Concerning the demands of our Croat brothers for the reincorpora-
tion of Dalmatia into Croatia and Slavonia … the Serbian parties 
are prepared to [support this] if the Croatian side … bindingly rec-
ognizes the equality of the Serbian nation with the Croatian.98
On 4 November 90, the parliamentary club of the Croatian Party and 
the club of the Serbian National Party signed a declaration in the Dalma-
tian parliament to that effect, stating that “the Croats and Serbs are one 
people, equal to one another”. The two parliamentary clubs further agreed 
to interchangeably use Serbian and Croatian language and flags, to allow 
for Serbian culture and history to be aptly represented in education and 
for judicial use of Cyrillic script when cases are filed in that script.99 This 
agreement was a cornerstone of a coalition that was announced a month 
later, becoming a significant factor in Croatia-Slavonia after the elections 
of May 906.  
In 909 Ban Rauch of Croatia-Slavonia attempted to dismantle the 
Croato-Serbian political coalition by trying fifty-three Serbs (mostly sup-
porters of the Serbian Independent Party) for high treason, for encouraging 
Serbian nationalism aiming to destroy the Empire. It was evident that this 
trial was purely political, and Rauch failed to dismantle the Coalition. At 
the same time the trial demonstrated the existence of a strong Serbian na-
tional consciousness in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, even if it could not 
prove its subversive nature. 
Aleksa Djilas explains how the Croatian-Serbian Coalition success-
fully joined the Croatian and the Serbian interests:
The Yugoslavism of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition was made pos-
sible by its emphasis on liberal-democratic political institutions 
and on the universal right of nations to self-determination. Argu-
ments for political legitimacy had moved away from the irreconcil-
able Croatian and Serbian national ideologies based on historical 
98 Stenograficki zapisnici sabora Kraljevine Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije (1901–1906) 
[Minutes of the Parliament of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia] (Za-
greb: Tisak kraljevske zemaljske tiskare, 903), v. , pt. , 966, quoted in Miller, Between 
Nation and State, 83.
99 Minutes of the meeting in Zadar held on 4 November 90, printed as a document 
“Sporazum sa Hrvatima” [Agreement with the Croats] by the Serb Dubrovnik printing 
house, kept in the Archives of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Dr F. Nikić 
Fund, no. 4.8; reproduced in Krestić, Gradja, 4-44.
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memories. The Coalition opposed the participation of clergy in         
political affairs and held that religious beliefs and values were the 
private concern of the individual. This separation of the churches 
from politics helped to remove an important obstacle to Croatian 
and Serbian cooperation and unity.00
Nevertheless, the Serbian Radicals rapidly abandoned the Coalition, claim-
ing that Serbian interests could not be forwarded in conjunction with the 
interests of the Croats in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and that Serbs 
should strive for autonomy from both the Habsburgs and the Croats.
Even the Serbian Independents had important disagreements with 
the Croatian political parties. One of these involved a strong opposition to 
the annexation of Bosnia. Although the Independents considered that Bos-
nia should become part of the Kingdom of Serbia, they were only able to 
protest against the Austro-Hungarian annexation indirectly, objecting that 
it “was carried out against the precedent of the Berlin agreement ... [and 
that] the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not consulted”.0
Although party politics and parliamentary action significantly ma-
tured in the nineteenth-century provinces of Croatia-Slavonia and Dal-
matia, Allcock concludes that, “as in Slovenia, the political class … was ex-
tremely small”. The difference was that some Croat nobility survived, and 
that “Croats had not been marginalized within the urban middle strata to 
the same extent as had the Slovenes”.0 Yet, the electorate amounted to less 
than two percent of the population, 0–60% of which were state officials. 
The new electoral law of 90 increased the number of eligible voters to 
only eight percent.03 Seton-Watson also observed a lack of democracy in 
Croatia of that period (Croatia-Slavonia province): Public voting and tax 
qualification which was extremely high for so poor a country, made ‘free-
dom of election’ in Croatia a mere farce.04
The Austro-Hungarian Croats and Serbs entered the twentieth cen-
tury with their respective national consciousness fully awakened, but with 
different and evermore opposing national goals. A comprehensive but high-
ly uncritical Croatian History, originally published in five volumes between 
899 and 9, thus speaks about the Croatian struggle for nationhood and 
“reunification of Croatian lands”, ignoring Serbian interests and even their 
00 Djilas, Contested Country, 34-3.
0 Miller, Between Nation and State, 4.
0 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, .
03 Charles Jelavich, “The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire in the Nineteenth 
Century”, Austrian History Yearbook 3, No.  (967), 99.
04 R. W. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question (London, 9), 04-0.
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presence,0 while Serbs fail to understand the Croat attachment to what 
they perceive to be their “historical state rights”. The ensuing world wars 
and civil wars brought the Croato-Serb conflict to the fore, with both the 
first and the second Yugoslavia failing to accommodate the two nations’ op-
posing aspirations.06
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